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Introduction
[Corruption] deepens poverty; it debases human rights; it degrades the envi-
ronment; it derails development, including private sector development; it can
drive conflict in and between nations; and it destroys confidence in democ-
racy and the legitimacy of governments. It debases human dignity and is
universally condemned by the world's major faiths. 1
Corruption is widely condemned yet widely practiced. Firms estab-
lish procedures to assure that their employees are not bribed by others,
while simultaneously using bribes to obtain business. Firms from coun-
tries with minimal domestic corruption play a major role as bribe-payers in
corrupt environments.2 Many explanations may be offered for these seem-
ingly inconsistent actions by private firms. Their participation in some
forms of corruption may be explained by a variety of factors including
competitive necessity, respect for local cultural norms, extortion, and
inability or unwillingness to control rogue employees. At the same time,
public opinion appears to be turning strongly against corrupt practices
and demanding that something be done about bribery. A confluence of
factors has produced a changing environment in which corruption is now
viewed as extremely problematic. If these trends continue, firms will do
their shareholders a disservice if they fail to take aggressive steps to ensure
that they are not perceived as contributing to corruption. Yet firms face the
problem that they may find themselves at a competitive disadvantage if
they refuse to pay bribes while others continue to do so.
This article describes one viable strategy for firms: a commitment to
Sullivan-like anti-bribery principles. 3 We present a specific set of princi-
ples, which we have termed the C2 Principles,4 for voluntary adoption by
firms. These principles require firms to implement procedures to prevent
the payment of bribes and to publicly disclose their progress and efforts
towards these ends.
Part I of this article documents the costs of corruption on society and
reviews empirical evidence on the importing and exporting of corruption
1. The Durban Commitment to Effective Action Against Corruption, signed by 1600
delegates from 135 countries at the October 1999 Anti-Corruption Conference spon-
sored by Transparency International.
2. Interestingly, there are a few countries for which the opposite is true. In some
cases, firms from more corrupt home environments are perceived as relatively less likely
to pay bribes in foreign transactions. See infra Part I.B (discussing the empirical evi-
dence of which countries' firms are paying bribes).
3. See infra Part IV.A.
4. The term "C2 Principles" emphasizes that they are focused on and limited to
combating corruption. These principals have been expressly endorsed and approved by
the Caux Roundtable as a recommended means of implementing Principle No. 7 of the
Caux Roundtable's Principals for Business. See infra note 80 and accompanying text. The
Caux Roundtable is an international organization of senior business leaders. In 1994,
they published an influential set of principles to provide a worldwide standard for
responsible corporate behavior. See the Caux Roundtable's homepage (visited Dec. 22,
2000) <http://www.cauxroundtable.org/>. Should they be endorsed and supported by
one or more academic centers and/or business organizations, they may be identified
with the endorsing organization(s).
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in international business. Part II discusses the emerging worldview that
corruption is a problem that must be eradicated and its implications for
corporate management. Part III considers businesspersons' possible expla-
nations and justifications for paying bribes. Part IV discusses a Sullivan-
type principles approach and presents the C2 Principles for adoption by
firms.
I. The Paradox of Corruption
Our analysis is limited to coarse bribery of public officials by representa-
tives of private sector firms. The term "coarse" distinguishes dearly harm-
ful bribery from common practices involving social gifts and
entertainment and cases where payments may constitute an authentic and
accepted method of compensation. Although such provincial bribery may
indeed be damaging, particularly when considered as a slippery slope lead-
ing to coarse bribery, it is not the primary concern here. Coarse bribery is
defined as the promise or payment of a benefit that induces a public offi-
cial to breach a duty pertaining to a significant community interest. This
definition is somewhat narrower than the definition used by the World
Bank: "the use of public power for private benefit."5 In most cases, coarse
bribery involves the payment of substantial sums of money or goods. How-
ever, in some cases, this form of bribery may involve a relatively small sum
of money, as for example, in the case of an official in a developing country
taking a relatively small sum of money to allow violations of important
environmental or construction code regulations. Coarse bribery will gen-
erally be referred to as "corruption." Vito Tanzi indicates that corruption
is most likely in investment projects, procurement spending, and extra-
budgetary accounts.6 Since the present concern is corporate bribe payers,
the role of government policies will not be considered except as relevant to
the limited focus.7
Scholars studying the corruption phenomenon have noted a unique
paradox: corruption is universally disapproved yet universally prevalent.8
This paradox continues even though the 1990s saw corruption become one
of the most important policy issues in the international economy. In 1997,
nations belonging to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
5. Vito Tanzi, Corruption Around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope, and Cures,
45 IMF STAFF PAPERS 559, 564 (1998).
6. Id. at 568-69.
7. For an excellent discussion of the issue of corruption in government with an
emphasis on demand-side solutions, see generally SusAN RosE-AcKERMAN, CoRRUPTION
AND GOVERNMENT (1999) (analyzing the corruption cleansing potential of better pay for
officials, criminal enforcement and civil service reforms). For a review of both supply-
side and demand-side solutions to international bribery, see Steven R. Salbu, A Delicate
Balance: Legislation, Institutional Change, and Transnational Bribery, 33 CORNELL INT'L
LJ. 657 (2000).
8. See, e.g., Francois Vincke, The State and the Civil Society in the Fight Against Cor-
ruption: The Business Community's Attitude Towards Corruption. Special Focus on Private-
to-Private Corruption, Paper Prepared for Presentation at the 8th International Anti-Cor-
ruption Conference (Sept. 7-11, 1997) (visited Oct. 25, 2000) <http://www.oecd.org/
daf/nocorruption/pdf/vincke.pdf>.
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Development (OECD) signed the anti-corruption convention, which high-
lights this invigorated focus on corruption. 9 At the same time, however,
one-third of the respondents to Transparency International's 1999 survey
of private sector leaders in fourteen emerging market economies estimated
that corruption has increased over the past five years.' 0 How are we to
understand these contradictory trends? This section provides an overview
of modern corruption's impact and the manner in which corrupt practices
flow between regions of the world.
A. The Costs of Corruption
The level of corruption that persists is staggering in scope; it involves enor-
mous sums of money. While it is impossible to determine the current pre-
cise level of coarse bribery, a 1997 World Bank estimate placed the total
corruption involved in international trade at $80 billion per year." A
recent World Bank survey of 3600 firms in sixty-nine countries found that
40% of those businesses pay bribes.12 In industrial countries, 15% of
businesses were found to pay bribes, but in the former Soviet Union, this
figure jumped to over 60%.13
Tremendous levels of corruption impose many costs on societies. Cor-
ruption limits a government's ability to perform vital functions and may
even threaten its overall effectiveness. The Financial Times recently
reported that "deep corruption [in China] is corroding the exercise of state
power." 14 Falsified accounts used to cover up this corruption have ren-
dered China's official statistics "virtually meaningless."' 5 In Ecuador, esti-
mates indicate that the government could pay off its foreign debt in five
years if corruption was brought under control. 16 In Argentina, corruption
in the customs department defrauded the government out of $3 billion in
9. As of this writing, twenty countries have enacted domestic legislation in compli-
ance with the Convention. See Beverly Earle, Bribery and Corruption in Eastern Europe,
the Baltic States and the Commonwealth of Independent States: What Is To Be Done?, 33
CORNELL INT'L LJ. 483 (2000).
10. See Transparency Int'l, The Transparency International Bribe Payers Survey (vis-
ited Aug. 25, 2000) <http://www.transparency.de/documents/cpi/bps.html> [hereinaf-
ter Bribe Payers Survey]. In addition, 25 percent of respondents stated that corruption
has decreased, 22 percent stated that corruption has stayed the same, and 20 percent
did not know. See id.
11. SeeJames Walsh, A World War on Bribery, TIME, June 22, 1998, at 16. The World
Bank estimate is based on the assumption that bribery makes up five percent of all
foreign direct investment and imports into countries with high levels of corruption. See
id.
12. See Thomas Omestad, Bye-Bye to Bribes: The Industrial World Takes Aim at Offi-
cial Corruption, US NEws & WORLD REP., Dec. 22, 1997, at 42.
13. See id.
14. James Kynge, China Uncovers Falsified Accounts in State Groups, FIN. TIMES
(London), Dec. 24, 1997, at 7.
15. Id.
16. See Corruption Reports: A Sample of Corruption Cases From Around the World, TI
NEwsL. (Transparency Int'l), Sept. 1999. Corruption costs Ecuador approximately $2
billion every year. See id.
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revenues. 17 Officials estimated that 30% of all imports were under-billed
and approximately $10 billion of goods over a four-year period were
brought into the country under the guise of being labeled "in transit" to
another country, thus illegally avoiding import taxes altogether.' 8 Corrup-
tion also influences government spending, moving it out of vital functions,
such as education and public health, and into projects where public offi-
cials can more easily extract bribes. 19
The personal financial gains of corrupt public officials show why
these problems persist. In Mexico, suspicions surround the ability of Raul
Salinas, the brother of former President Carlos Salinas, to amass a fortune
of over $120 million while serving as a public official.20 South Korea con-
victed two former presidents for developing a fund of over $900 million
while they were in office in the 1980s and 1990S.21 At the local level, in
Grenoble, France, the city mayor was convicted for personally receiving
$1.8 million in 1989 while selling the city water system.22
Corruption also imposes tremendous costs on business. While Ameri-
can companies complain of lost contracts because of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act (FCPA),23 companies in other countries complain of the
bribes they must pay to obtain those contracts. For example, German com-
panies are estimated to pay over $3 billion a year in bribes to obtain busi-
ness contracts abroad.24 In Indonesia, it is estimated that bribes to
bureaucrats account for 20% of business costs. 25 In Albania, businesses
lose approximately one-third of their potential profits to bribe payments,
amounting to 8% of inventory turnover.26
B. Importing and Exporting Corruption
Just as it is difficult to determine levels of bribery and corruption, it is
equally difficult to determine which countries are producing the greatest
supply of and demand for corruption. Secrecy is a defining characteristic
17. See Andrea Campbell, Argentines Give Import to Fraud Crackdown, FIN. TIMES
(London), Dec. 3, 1997, at 5.
18. See id.
19. See Tanzi, supra note 5, at 585-86; Paolo Mauro, Corruption: Causes, Conse-
quences, and Agenda for Further Research, 32 FIN. & DEv. 11, 12 (1998) (finding that
corruption lowers government spending on education and public health services).
20. See Walsh, supra note 11, at 16.
21. See Ken Guggenheim, Corruption, Not Revolutions or Coups, Topples Governments
These Days, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1996, at A4.
22. See id.
23. Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 to
-2 (1994)). Former U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor stated that between April
1994 and May 1995, the government was aware of almost 100 contracts, valued collec-
tively at $45 billion, that U.S. firms lost due to competitor's bribes. See U.S. Eyes Interna-
tional Measures to Combat Bribery, JAPAN EcON. NEwswma, Mar. 7, 1996, available in
Lmxas; Marlise Simons, U.S. Enlists Rich Nations in Move to End Business Bribes, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 12, 1996, at A10.
24. See Guggenheim, supra note 21, at A4; Honest trade: A Global War Against Brib-
ery, ECONOMIST, Jan. 16, 1999, at 22, 23 [hereinafter Honest Trade].
25. See Honest Trade, supra note 24, at 24.
26. See id. at 23.
Cornell International Law Journal
of corruption. As John Noonan has noted, no one boasts publicly about
the bribes that they have paid or taken.27
Transparency International has led the way in attempting to determine
which countries are the home of bribe-takers, i.e., which countries have
public officials who are abusing their position for their own personal
profit.28 Every year Transparency International publishes the Corruption
Perception Index (CPI), which is a ranking of countries based on the per-
ceived level of corruption in those countries. The countries' rankings are
based on seventeen different polls and surveys of business people, risk ana-
lysts, and the general public, conducted by a variety of organizations. 29
The 1999 CPI ranked ninety-nine countries, with Denmark being perceived
as the "cleanest" country and Cameroon as the most corrupt. The United
States ranked eighteenth in the index, placing it as perceived to be more
corrupt than Canada, Singapore, the United Kingdom, and Germany, but
less corrupt than Japan, Italy, and Mexico. 30
Not surprisingly, the CPI created a significant amount of controversy
among the countries that ranked low in the index. An outspoken critic of
the CPI was Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad. Mohamad
argued that the countries that appeared clean in the CPI poll, mostly Euro-
pean and North American countries, were just as much to blame for the
level of corruption in the countries at the bottom of the CPI due to clean
countries' "exported corruption."31
In 1999, Transparency International and Gallup International
addressed these concerns by looking at the supply side of corruption.
These organizations conducted a survey of almost 800 business executives
in fourteen emerging market economies, asking them to rank the likeli-
hood of companies from the nineteen largest exporting countries to pay
bribes. The results of this survey created the Bribe Payers Index (BPI). 32
In the BPI, Sweden, Australia, and Canada are perceived to have the "cle-
anest" corporations, while China, South Korea, Taiwan, and Italy have cor-
porations that are perceived to be the most likely to pay bribes. The United
States ranks in the middle of perceived bribe payers. 33
27. See JOHN T. NOONAN, BRIBES (1984).
28. See Transparency International, Press Release: New Poll Shows Many Leading
Exporters Using Bribes (Oct. 26, 1999) (visited Aug. 26, 2000) <http://www.transpar
ency.de/documents/cpi/cpi-bpLpress-release.html>.
29. No country in the index is included in all 17 surveys. A country must be
included in at least three surveys to be included in the index. See id.
30. See id.
31. Greg Steinmetz, U.S. Firms Appear Among Least Likely to Bribe Overseas, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 25, 1997, at 9A.
32. See Bribe Payers Survey, supra note 10.
33. Johann Graf Lambsdorff, an economics professor at Goettingen University in
Germany and collaborator on the CPI index, conducted an initial attempt to determine
which countries' corporations were paying bribes. See id. Lambsdorff used a regression
analysis to determine the propensity of a certain country's business firms to pay bribes
based on their level of exports to corrupt countries, after controlling for other influenc-
ing factors, such as language barriers, geographic proximity, and the composition of
products traded. This study relies on the assumption that corporations with an inclina-
Vol. 33
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Table I compares both the CPI and BPI rankings of the nineteen coun-
tries included in both indexes.3 4 Comparing each country's supply of and
demand for corruption reveals important variations. Sweden and Canada
are the cleanest on both dimensions-they rank the highest on both
indexes, while China, South Korea, Italy, and Malaysia have both a high
demand for and high supply of corruption. Some countries appear to have
a double standard for corruption-discouraging it at home, but engaging in
it abroad. For example, Singapore ranks third out of nineteen countries in
the CPI but eleventh in the BPI. Conversely, certain countries have corrup-
tion at home, but their companies are perceived as less likely to pay bribes
in foreign countries. Belgium and Austria stand out as this type of country.
The United States, expected to rank highly on the BPI because, until the
OECD Convention, it was the only country to criminalize bribery, ranks in
the middle of both indexes. In fact, the United States is tied with Germany
on the BPI, a country that until recently allowed tax deductions for
bribes.35
Table 1: CPI and BPI Rankings
Country CPI BPI Rankings Move
Sweden 1 1 0
Canada 2 2 0
Singapore 3 11 -8
Netherlands 4 6 -2
Switzerland 5 5 0
Australia 6 2 +4
USA 10 9 +1
France 11 13 -1
Spain 11 12 -1
Japan 13 14 -1
Taiwan 14 17 -3
Belgium 15 8 +7
Malaysia 16 15 +1
Italy 17 16 +1
South Korea 18 18 0
China 19 19 0
The higher the ranking (and the lower the number), the "cleaner" the
country.
tion to pay bribes have an advantage over "cleaner" corporations in countries that have a
high level of corruption.
His study included the 18 largest exporters and 87 importing countries. This 1997
study found that firms from Belgium (including Luxembourg), France, Italy, and the
Netherlands, were the most likely to pay bribes, while Malaysia, Sweden, Austria, Austra-
lia, and the United States were the least likely. The most striking difference between this
attempt and the BPI is Malaysia's ranking as the most clean in Lambsdorff's study, but
one of the most likely to pay bribes in the BPI. Lambsdorff's study also ranked Belgium
as having the highest level of bribery, while the BPI has it in the middle. SeeJennifer M.
Freedman, Study Shows Bribery An Everyday Element Of World Trade, DowJorNms ONuINE
NEws, Sept. 8, 1997.
34. See infra tbl.1.
35. A comparison of these 19 countries based on their actual scores in the two
indexes produces the same results as those discussed above.
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II. An Emerging World View on Corruption and Bribery
Throughout the world, there is evidence of changing attitudes about cor-
ruption and bribery. Governments, NGOs, and even the general public are
starting to recognize the damage caused by coarse bribery and therefore
the need to take aggressive steps to control it. In September 1997, World
Bank president James Wolfensohn said: "Only 18 months ago, the word
corruption was never mentioned. Today, there is a publicly expressed
revulsion, on moral, on social, and on economic grounds."36 Initiatives by
international governmental and non-governmental organizations to com-
bat bribery reflect this emerging worldview. While it remains to be seen if
these efforts will be successful or if countries will follow through on their
pledges, these efforts do show a recognition that corruption is an issue
"that brings the crowds out on to the streets and cannot be ignored by
governments or business."3 7
A. Drivers of the Anti-Corruption Movement
Changes in the global marketplace over the past several years have com-
bined to make bribery and corruption one of the central issues in interna-
tional business today. Rather than a single cause, the anti-corruption
movement appears to have many parents. The following events are some of
the likely candidates.
The Growing Global Marketplace. The "borderless" global marketplace
is bringing national economies and corporations throughout the world into
increasingly greater interdependence. The decade leading up to 1996 saw
an 80% increase in world trade.38 Issues that can affect the functioning of
effective markets in one region of the world can now affect the entire global
market; corruption is finally being recognized as one of those issues. 39 In
addition, nations are recognizing that corruption can have a negative
impact on the effective functioning of global capital markets and any par-
ticular country's access to those markets.40 Uniform standards of financial
reporting and overall transparency are necessary elements of attaining
investor confidence in the capital markets. Further, nations are recogniz-
36. Diane Coyle, West Targets Third World Corruption, INDEPENDENT, Sept. 21, 1997,
at 14.
37. Honest Trade, supra note 24, at 22.
38. See Lucinda A. Low & Kathryn Cameron Atkinson, Led by the U.S., the World
Wages War on Corruption, NAT'L L. J., Mar. 3, 1997, at B14.
39. See Barbara Crutchfield George et al., On the Threshold of the Adoption of Global
Antibribery Legislation: A Critical Analysis of Current Domestic and International Efforts
Towards the Reduction of Business Corruption, 32 VAN. J. TRMSNAT'L L. 1, 25 n.150
(1999) (noting the impact of the Asian financial crisis on U.S. and European industries);
Walsh, supra note 11, at 16 (noting that "[h]ardly anyone paid attention to the cost of
corruption when economies grew at double-digit rates, but the economic collapse in
Asia has driven home the price everyone pays for such practices").
40. See George et al., supra note 39, at 26 (noting how poor governance can lower
investor confidence).
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ing that corruption lowers foreign direct investment in -their country4 ' and
can rob the country of significant sums in import tax revenue.
High-Profile Cases. Many high-profile cases in the 1990s increased the
attention placed on corruption. In South Korea, two former presidents
were convicted and imprisoned for accepting hundreds of millions of dol-
lars in bribes.42 In Italy, the Tangentopoli (meaning "bribe city") investiga-
tion led to the conviction of a former prime minister.4 3 In both Brazil and
Venezuela, Presidents were impeached due to bribery charges.44 Similar
cases come from Mexico, Spain, Ecuador, and others.4 5 These high-profile
cases dramatically demonstrate the seriousness of corruption to all
national leaders, policymakers, and the public. They encourage those who
would seek to enforce anti-corruption laws or promulgate stronger policies.
The End of the Cold War. Although the end of the Cold War brought
increased attention to corruption, it also led to greater opportunities for
corruption. The collapse of the Soviet Union and socialist governments in
Europe allowed policymakers all over the world to focus their attention on
other matters, including corruption and its negative consequences.4 6 In
addition, nations no longer felt the strong pressure to support corrupt gov-
ernments in order to advance other geopolitical interests.4 7 The end of the
Cold War also increased the independence of the judges and prosecutors
and created a stronger free press.4 8 At the same time, paradoxically, the
opening up of markets and the privatization of state-owned enterprises
increased opportunities for corruption.49 Further involvement in global
trade by countries with high corruption may also contribute to increased
instances of coarse bribery.
41. See Honest Trade, supra note 24, at 22. Research by Harvard economist Shang-Jin
Wei shows that corruption is the equivalent of placing a tax on foreign direct investment.
See id.
42. Guggenheim, supra note 21, at A4; Omestad, supra note 12, at 22.
43. Omestad, supra note 12, at 22.
44. John Brademas & Fritz Heimann, Tackling International Corruption: No Longer
Taboo, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 1998, at 18.
45. See id.
46. See George et al., supra note 39, at 22-23; Carolyn Hotchkiss, The Sleeping Dog
Stirs: New Signs of Life in Efforts to End Corruption in International Business, 17 J. PuB.
POL'Y & MARKEING 108 (1998).
47. See Stuart Marc Weiser, Dealing with Corruption: Effectiveness of Existing Regimes
on Doing Business, 91 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 99, 105-11 (1997) (presenting the com-
ments of Nancy Zucker Boswell). The pressure to support corrupt governments was the
result of a "the enemy of my enemy is my friend" approach to foreign policy. See George
et al., supra note 39; see also Tanzi, supra note 5, at 560 (noting the political hypocrisy
that led to the overlooking of high-level corruption as long as those leaders were in the
right political camp).
48. See Brademas & Heimann, supra note 44; see also Tanzi, supra note 5, at 560-61
(arguing that the increase of democratic governments and a free press has created an
environment where the "discussion of corruption is no longer a taboo").
49. See Tanzi, supra note 5, at 563-64. For example, to obtain a low price on compa-
nies and real estate formerly owned by the East German government, a German busi-
nessman paid $3.75 million in bribes to an agency official overseeing the privatization.
Guggenheim, supra note 21, at A4.
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B. International Efforts to Combat Corruption
The confluence of these factors galvanized international efforts to combat
bribery and corruption, ranging from multilateral initiatives to uprisings
from the local citizenry. The following sections briefly describe examples
of these efforts which illustrate an emerging world view that places corrup-
tion as one of the central issues of domestic and global policy.
1. Multinational Organizations
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. The most signifi-
cant advancement in the fight against corruption and the strongest demon-
stration of its universal condemnation is the OECD's Convention on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions, which entered into force oi February 15, 1999.50 The Con-
vention requires signatories to criminalize the bribery of any foreign public
official and prohibit accounting practices that facilitate the payment or
concealment of bribes.5 1 The United States amended the FCPA in 1998 to
comply with the OECD Convention's stricter provisions.5 2 These amend-
ments included expanded definitions of "bribery" and "foreign public
official."5 3
The Convention, adopted in 1997, has yet to receive widespread recog-
nition in the private sector. Thirty-eight percent of the executives who
responded to Transparency International's 1999 survey stated that they
had not heard of the Convention, and another 43% stated that they had
"only heard about it," as opposed to knowing something about its provi-
sions.54 Of the 19% of respondents who were familiar with or at least
knew something about the Convention, less than one-fifth reported that
their organizations were reviewing their practices in response to the
convention. 55
In January 2000, the OECD released for comment a draft version of its
guidelines for multinational enterprises.5 6 In addition to chapters on such
topics as the environment and industrial relations, the guidelines directly
addressed combating bribery.57 The guidelines not only provide that cor-
porations should not offer or pay bribes, but that they should also estab-
lish and disclose compliance systems and employee training programs. 58
50. See OECD, Welcome to the OECD Anti-Corruption Unit (last modified Sept. 1,
2000) <www.oecd.org/daf/nocorruption/index.htm>.
51. Signatories are not required to criminalize "facilitating" payments. See Christo-
pher F. Corr &Judd Lawler, Damned if You Do, Damned if You Don't? The OECD Conven-
tion and the Globalization of Anti-Bribery Measures, 32 VAND.J. TRASNAT'L L. 1249, 1304
(1999).
52. See George et al., supra note 39, at 11.
53. See id. at 11-12.
54. See Bribe Payers Survey, supra note 10.
55. See id.
56. See OECD, The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (last modified Jan.
2000) <http://wwwv.oas.org/juridico/english/Treaties/b-58.html>.
57. See id. at 13.
58. See id.
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Organization of American States (OAS). The Organization of American
States, which consists of thirty-four nations in the Western Hemisphere,
adopted the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption in 1996.59
This agreement requires all signatories to criminalize bribery by adopting
laws that are the "rough equivalent" of the FCPA.60 In many ways, however,
the Convention goes beyond the FCPA's provisions. The Convention pro-
vides for financial disclosure and transparency in accounting practices, as
well as asset seizure, extradition, and international cooperation in the col-
lection of evidence. 6 1
Council of Europe. The Council of Europe, which currently has 41
member nations,6 2 established the Multidisciplinary Group on Corruption
(GMC) in September 1994.63 In 1998, the GMC established the Group of
States Against Corruption (GRECO) to monitor the implementation of the
Guiding Principles for the Fight against Corruption, which had been
adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in 1997.64
GRECO's monitoring role includes reviewing member states' efforts in fur-
therance of the Guiding Principles and issuing public statements if a mem-
ber state "remains passive or takes insufficient action" with respect to the
Principles.65 The public disclosure approach is consistent with GRECO's
statement that the "means of mutual evaluation and peer pressure" allow
"flexible and efficient" monitoring of the Guiding Principles.6 6 In addi-
tion, the Council of Europe has recently passed the Criminal Law Conven-
tion on Corruption. 67
United Nations. In 1996, the UN General Assembly adopted the Decla-
ration against Corruption and Bribery in International Transactions. 68
The declaration calls for countries to eliminate tax deductions for bribes
and to criminalize bribery. It also encourages cooperation between coun-
tries in sharing information necessary for criminal investigations and
59. Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, Organization of American States,
Third Plenary Session (Mar. 29, 1996) <http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/Treaties/
b-58.html>.
60. See Steven R. Salbu, Bribery in the Global Market: A Critical Analysis of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 229, 234 (1997).
61. See id.
62. See Council of Eur., About the Council of Europe, (visited Feb. 10, 2001) <http://
www.coe.fr/eng/present/about.htm>.
63. See Council of Eur., Council of Europe's Fight Against Corruption and Organised
Crime (visited Sept. 20, 2000) <http://www.coe.fr/corruption/epresent.htn>. The acro-
nym GMC, Le Groupe Multidisciplinaire sur la Corruption, is from the French translation
of "the Multidisciplinary Group on Corruption."
64. Committee of Ministers, Agreement Establishing the Group of States Against Cor-
ruption (GRECO), 102nd Session, May 4-5, 1998 (visited Feb. 10, 2001) <http://wwv.
doj.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/E2198.htm>.
65. Id. art. 16.
66. Id.
67. Council of Eur., Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (Jan. 27, 1999) <http://
www.coe.fr/eng/legaltxt/173e.htm>.
68. United Nations Declaration Against Corruption and Bribery in International Trans-
actions, G.A. Res. 51/191, U.N. 9AOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 49, Annex, Agenda Item 12,
U.N. Doc. A/51/49 (1996).
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other legal proceedings. 69
IMF and World Bank. Traditionally, the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and the World Bank attempted to avoid any involvement in a coun-
try's internal politics. 70 In the 1990s, however, they realized that absten-
tion was no longer a feasible approach to attaining their objectives. For
example, the World Bank estimated that 20-30% of its lending to Indonesia
went to corrupt officials.71 In response, both organizations have taken
active measures to reduce corruption. For example, the IMF and World
Bank suspended over $290 million in loans to Kenya, a country with
numerous alleged corruption scandals. 72
In 1997, the World Bank adopted guidelines on preventing bribery in
Bank projects. 73 The guidelines concern not only borrowers and bidders
on Bank loans, but also contractors and suppliers involved in the perform-
ance of Bank-supported contracts. If the Bank determines that corruption
or fraudulent practices have occurred, possible sanctions include: rejection
of an existing bid, loss of any remaining funds allocated for previously-
granted contracts, and, for a specified period of time, ineligibility for future
World Bank-financed contracts.74 The guidelines also require a contract
provision granting the World Bank the right to inspect the accounts and
records of all parties involved in a Bank-supported contract and to have
them audited by Bank-appointed auditors. 75
2. International Non-Governmental Organizations
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). In 1977, the International
Chamber of Commerce became the first non-governmental organization to
establish rules of conduct relating to bribery. The ICC also established a
panel to oversee the application of the rules of conduct, 76 provide interpre-
tations of the rules, and hear alleged infringements.77 If a firm thought
that a competitor was engaging in corrupt practices, that firm could
request an investigation by the panel. The basic idea was for the business
community to enact self-regulation and enforce it, although the ICC con-
templated no specific sanctions. After seventeen years, the panel had only
69. See id.
70. See Omestad et al., supra note 12, at 22.
71. See Honest Trade, supra note 24, at 22.
72. See Omestad et al., supra note 12, at 22. It was alleged that twenty percent of the
Kenyan government's annual spending (approximately $400 million) went to subsidize a
business's exporting of gold and diamonds to Switzerland, even though Kenya has no
gold or diamond resources. Id. Other allegations include bribes paid for the evasion of
import duties. Id.
73. World Bank, Preventing Corruption in Bank Projects: Procurement Guidelines, (vis-
ited Feb. 10, 2001) <http://www.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/preventing.
htm>.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. See Weiser, supra note 47, at 99 (presenting the comments of Francois Vincke,
chair of the ICC's 1994 ad hoc committee on bribery).
77. See id.
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heard one case before it, and it was officially disbanded. 78
In 1995, an ICC committee issued a report establishing new corporate
rules of conduct and providing recommendations to governments and
other international organizations. These rules of conduct go beyond the
FCPA's provisions by prohibiting any form or technique of bribery and by
not making a distinction between public officials and private persons as
the recipients of bribes.79 The rules recommend that corporations adopt
their own codes of conduct based on the ICC's rules, but adapted to their
particular situation. These rules were updated in 1999, and those provi-
sions are discussed below.80
Caux Roundtable. The Caux Roundtable is an international organiza-
tion of more than 250 business leaders from over twenty-five countries. In
1994, the Roundtable published its Principles for Business to establish an
international standard for responsible corporate behavior. Since their pub-
lication, the Principles have gained widespread support in North America,
Europe, and Japan.81 One of the seven general principles of business
adopted by the members of the organization is the "avoidance of illicit
operations," which states in part that "[a] business should not participate
in or condone bribery, money laundering, or other corrupt practices:
indeed, it should seek cooperation with others to eliminate them."8 2
Transparency International. Transparency International (TI) is an
international non-governmental organization established in 1993 to com-
bat corruption. TI now has chapters in over sixty countries, with its main
office in Berlin. The 1999 International Anti-Corruption Conference, held
in South Africa with TI as the secretariat, drew 1600 delegates from 135
countries.83 At the meeting, the delegates adopted a resolution encourag-
ing the full implementation of the OECD convention and calling for
enforceable international conventions to reduce money laundering and
facilitate the return to developing countries any money illegally obtained
by corrupt public officials. Transparency International official Nancy
Zucker Boswell stated that this was a dramatic change from 1993, when
"few governments or institutions would openly confront the issue of
corruption." 84
78. See id. at 101. Vincke believes that the panel failed because corporations believed
in having either a self-regulatory approach or a judicial approach but not both. The
business community considered the panel a quasi-judicial process and therefore never
completely accepted it. See id.
79. See Vincke, supra note 8, at 12.
80. See infra Part IV.C.
81. See Caux Roundtable, Principles for Business (visited Dec. 22, 2000 <www.caux
roundtable.com/PRIN4.htm>.
82. See Caux Roundtable, Principles for Business (visited Dec. 22, 2000) <http://
www.cauxroundtable.org/ENGLISH.HTM>.
83. See Transparency Int'l, Press Release, Anti-Corruption Conference Ends with Call
for International Mechanisns to Recover Looted Money (Oct. 15, 1999) <http://www.irans
parency.de/documents/press-releases/1999/1999.10.15.durbancommitment.html>.
84. Nancy Zucker Boswell, The Law, Expectation, and Reality in the Marketplace: The
Problems of and Responses to Corruption, 30 LAw & PoL'Y INT'L Bus. 139 (1999).
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C. Public Uprising Against Corruption
Perhaps the most significant of the anti-corruption efforts and trends is the
fact that the general public appears to have lost its tolerance for corruption
and bribery. Recent articles in leading newspapers and magazines show
these strong attitudes. The Los Angeles Times reports, "Corruption, Not
Revolutions or Coups, Topples Governments These Days,"8 5 while the
Economist reports that "corruption is now an issue that brings the crowds
out on to the streets."86 In the 1990s, national governments in Italy, Brazil,
Pakistan, and Zaire fell, in part due to public uprising against corrup-
tion.87 This disapproval demonstrates that, contrary to the apparent
beliefs of many businesspersons operating in less developed regions of the
world, corruption is not a publicly accepted fact of life.
In the U.S., the government's enforcement of the FCPA reflects the
public's condemnation of bribery. Between 1977 and 1995, the Depart-
ment of Justice (DOJ) brought only sixteen prosecutions for bribery under
the FCPA.88 In 1998, however, it was estimated that the DOJ had over sev-
enty-five cases under investigation.8 9 In 1995, a regional vice-president of
Lockheed became the first person jailed for a FCPA violation. In 1996, the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filed its first civil enforcement
action of the FCPA in ten years; this was soon followed by others.90
The investment community is also taking a stand against corruption.
Noted corporate law attorney Ira Millstein recently stated that there is a
market-based movement against corruption. 91 He finds that investors and
lenders are making investment decisions based on the country or region's
record for transparency, corruption, and bribery. Due to their large size,
investors such as pension funds require a well-diversified portfolio, includ-
ing international securities. Accordingly, these investors are "using their
capital to demand good governance."92
This result is consistent with the idea that moral desires are embodied
in capital, consumer, and labor markets. The notion of "morality in mar-
kets" results from the aggregate expressions of participants' moral desires
in their choices as consumers, investors, and job-seekers. The recent
growth in socially screened mutual funds, social cause marketing by con-
sumer product firms, and human resources programs that allow employees
to engage in volunteer or pro bono work reflects that people are influenced
by their moral desires in economic transactions. Sometimes groups of indi-
viduals target particular firms as symbols of their concerns. For example,
Monsanto has become the object of protests and boycotts pertaining to
85. Guggenheim, supra note 21, at A4.
86. Honest Trade, supra note 24, at 22.
87. See id.
88. SeeJonnyJ. Frank & Wendy C. Schmidt, Steering Clear of the Bribery Trap When
Buying Abroad, 33 MERGERS & AcQuISITIONs 39, 41 (1998).
89. See id.
90. See Hotchkiss, supra note 46, at 110-11.
91. See ICC, Investors Demand Good Corporate Governance Free of Corruption (last
modified Feb. 29, 2000) <http://www.iccwbo.org>.
92. Id.
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genetically modified seeds.93
Thomas Dunfee has recently argued that the existence of morality
within markets creates specific obligations for corporate management:
1. There is a presumption that all corporate actions must be under-
taken to maximize shareholder wealth;
2. Managers must respond to existing marketplace morality and antic-
ipate changing marketplace morality that may have a negative impact on
shareholder wealth;
3. The presumption in principle 1 may be rebutted where clear and
convincing evidence exists that marketplace morality would justify a deci-
sion that cannot be shown to maximize shareholder wealth directly; and
4. Managers must act consistent with hypernorms (manifest universal
norms and principles). 94
Obligation 2 is most salient in the context of firms devising strategies
to combat bribery. When managers fail to anticipate changing moral atti-
tudes within the markets they serve and use, they may end up making deci-
sions that will have a negative impact on shareholder wealth. This
happened to the tobacco companies when they failed to appreciate chang-
ing attitudes about marketing cigarettes to children, 95 Shell Oil when it
failed to understand the non-scientific environmental concerns regarding
its plans to sink an old oil rig in the North Sea,96 and Nike when it failed to
appreciate and respond promptly to customer concerns that its shoes and
apparel were produced under sweatshop conditions.97
For our purposes, the issue is whether the apparently changing public
attitudes about corruption will ultimately play out in the same manner as
the changing attitudes about tobacco markets, the environment, and child
labor. If so, firms associated in the public's mind with bribery may suffer.
As with these other issues, some firms may face greater negative exposure.
In industries such as arms, defense, and public works construction where
public officials allocate large value projects, there is greater vulnerability to
pressure from corrupt payments. 98 Companies in this set that appear cava-
lier about corrupt practices may be particularly susceptible to public disap-
proval. The confluence of interest among governments, international
public organizations, non-governmental organizations, and professional
groups signals a potentially powerful wave of public opinion. Managers
who fail to anticipate this change do their shareholders great disservice.
93. See Youssef M. Ibrahim, Genetic Soybeans Alarm Europeans, N.Y. TiMeS, Nov. 7,
1996, at DI.
94. See Thomas W. Dunfee, Corporate Governance in a Market with Morality, 62 IAw
& CONTErMP. PROBS. 129, 149 (1999).
95. See THoMAs DONALDSON & THOMAS W. DuNFEE, TiEs THAT BiND: A SOCIAL CON-
TRACTS APPROACH TO BusiNEss ETHics 90 (1999).
96. See id. at 188.
97. See David Hess, Social Reporting: A Reflexive Law Approach to Corporate Social
Responsiveness, 25 J. COR'. L. 41, 45 n.22 (1999).
98. See Bribe Payers Survey, supra note 10 (reporting survey results showing that
defense, and public works sectors are the most likely to have high levels of corruption).
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III. Understanding the Paradoxes of Corruption and Practice
As illustrated above, coarse bribery is paradoxical for several reasons.
There is a growing movement against the practice, yet there is no hard evi-
dence that the level of corruption is declining-and it may even be increas-
ing. Firms aggressively seek to prevent the corruption of their own
employees while simultaneously approving of attempts to corrupt the
employees of potential suppliers. Firms from countries that have reputa-
tions for being relatively clean of corruption are thought to be major
sources of corruption in other countries. This section will evaluate alterna-
tive explanations for these paradoxes.
This section considers four possible explanations for behavior sup-
porting persistent corruption. First, the behavior may be explained by
competitive necessity; engaging in selective corrupt payments can be seen
as a sensible business strategy. Second, making corrupt payments may be
explained by widespread extortion. Third, a non-trivial amount of corrupt
payments may be due to the independent actions of employees who act
contrary to the announced policies of their employers. Finally, bribe pay-
ers may view payments as ethically justified because they respect local cul-
ture and avoid moral imperialism.
A. Competitive Necessity
Conversations with managers produce anecdotal evidence supporting the
proposition that, in particular cases, making corrupt payments is essential
to success in certain markets. Testimony in support of liberalizing the For-
eign Corrupt Practices Act in 1988 emphasized that U.S. businesses were
at a competitive disadvantage because of the Act's enforcement.99
Ultimately, whether bribery is justifiable as a competitive strategy is a
factual claim. Some firms argue that they have a competitive advantage
because they have a reputation for not paying bribes. For example, firms
such as General Electric and Honeywell may be able to obtain contracts not
available to others and may have lower costs due to the avoidance of pay-
ments. 100 Similarly, if a firm such as Coca Cola, which has a reputation
for eschewing the payment of bribes, either refuses to come into a particu-
lar market or leaves without a sound business reason, those actions are a
signal that the local officials are corrupt. 101
Evidence regarding the overall status of the competitive necessity
claim is mixed, 10 2 and it is difficult to obtain definitive data because of the
99. See Salbu, supra note 60, at 243; see also id. at 255-57 (presenting the arguments
of those claiming the FCPA puts U.S. businesses at a comparative disadvantage).
100. See Business for Soc. Responsibility (visited Nov. 10, 2000) <http://www.bsr.
org/resourcecenter/index.html>.
101. See Frank Vogl, Curbing Corruption: Making Progress with the Bribe-Givers, 3
ECON. PERsPEcrnEs (Nov. 1998) <http://www.usinfo.state.gov/journals/ites/1198/ijee/
vogl.htm> ("What leader in any country is willing to risk a public announcement by
Coca-Cola that it is quitting the country rather than pay a fat bribe to the head of state?
So far, none.").
102. See Thomas W. Dunfee et al., Social Contracts and Marketing Ethics, 63J. MARKET-
ING 14 (1999).
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secrecy that surrounds coarse bribes. However, two conclusions appear
warranted. First, there may be specific situations where making a payment
increases short-term profit for the bribe-paying firm. Second, the massive
amounts of bribery that apparently exist produce serious cooperation
problems for certain firms. If firms do not make the payments, they will
be seriously hurt in a particular market. Yet, if they do, they are contribut-
ing to the continuation of a system that works to disadvantage them. From
the perspective of these firms, criminalizing corrupt payments helps pro-
vide a level playing field.
As an important caveat, even if competitive necessity requires the pay-
ment of a bribe in a particular instance, it will not suffice as a full ethical
justification. Similarly, a defense of competitive necessity would not jus-
tify a dangerous and unsafe workplace. The major issue, however, dis-
cussed at length in the last section, is whether there are voluntary actions
that firms may take, singly or in cooperation with others, to resolve this
cooperation problem and thereby reduce the chances that other firms will
"defect" and pay bribes to gain a competitive advantage. Also, consumers
and investors may be increasingly willing to punish firms that are per-
ceived as corrupt by boycotting their products or shares. If this becomes
the case generally, then making corrupt payments may cease to be a viable
competitive strategy.
B. Extortion
Some instances of bribery result from direct personal threats of physical
harm to the bribe-payer or her family. As James Lindgren notes, "Although
the morality of giving in to a coercive extortion threat has been debated for
centuries, capitulating is often not illegal."103 Nonetheless, giving in to
extortion nonetheless is a violation of the Model Penal Code.104 Thus, the
dispute as to the ethical culpability parallels the debate in the law.
The morality of making extorted payments depends on the nature of
the threat and the circumstances surrounding the payment. Even though it
may be inappropriate to expect moral heroism on the part of managers, a
certain amount of moral courage should be exercised.10 5 Despite Scott
Turow's warning that "bribery can be justified only if the bribe-giver is
truly without alternatives," 106 there have been widely reported cases of
murders and other threats that have occurred within an environment
involving corrupt payments.
The problem exists in part because the extortion often cannot com-
plain to a legitimate authority. Complaining to the local police is not a
satisfactory option where the police are in league with those extorting the
payments. Instead, as discussed later, a credible body is needed, whose
103. James Lindgren, The Theory, History, and Practice of the Bribery-Extortion Dis-
tinction, 141 U. PA. L. Ray. 1695, 1698 (1993).
104. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.40.1 (1990).
105. Dunfee, et al., supra note 102, at 25.
106. Scott Turow, What's Wrong with Bribery, 4 J. Bus. ETHics 249, 251 (1985).
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integrity is unquestioned and whose intervention can be predictably
invoked.
Presumably, extortion explains only a very small number of corrupt
payments. Extortion exists in part because systemic coarse bribery pro-
vides the opportunity for the use of force. Here, in particular, eradicating
the demand side of the practice requires the effective rule of the criminal
law.
C. Rogue Employees
Many firms have recently strengthened and expanded internal compliance
and auditing systems designed to detect and discourage corrupt pay-
ments. 10 7 In addition, many have expanded ethics programs to assist
employees in dealing with these issues.10 8 For example, many firms have
installed "help lines," where employees can call, often anonymously, to
obtain advice on how to handle certain recurring situations.10 9
Implicit in these changes is the assumption that some employees, freed
from monitoring and effective controls, may be tempted to arrange corrupt
payments to get business for the firm. Presumably, the personal incentive
for rogue employees would be increased recognition or compensation from
the firm as a result of obtaining or retaining business through the corrupt
payments. This phenomenon could be called the "bad apple in the good
barrel." The firm desires that no payments be made, but it is unable to
control remote employees who are unable to resist the personal incentives
to pay bribes.
An alternative explanation illustrates the "good apple: the bad barrel"
phenomenon. Under this view, some firms appear hypocritical. They
state publidy that they have an anti-bribery policy and have provisions in
their codes of ethics that condemn improper payments. Yet, at the same
time, their internal compensation systems reward employees who produce
business, regardless of how the employees get their results. These circum-
stances suggest that senior managers overlook the payment of bribes and
turn a blind eye to anything suspicious; the firm compensates employees
solely on the basis of results. Such incentive schemes put pressure on
employees to produce, thereby creating a morally ambiguous environment
where employees are not certain how to act. This environment may seduce
reluctant employees into making improper payments.
For both possibilities, the solution seems clear. Firms must make a
genuine, strong commitment to controlling corrupt bribes, align incentives
and evaluations to reflect the firm's policies, review compensation systems
to make sure they do not provide incentives for bribes, and implement
financial and management controls designed to lessen the chances that
107. See, e.g., Patrick J. Head, The Development of Compliance Programs: One Com-
pany's Experience, 18 Nw. J. IN' L. & Bus. 535 (1998) (explaining the experiences of
the FMC Corporation).
108. See Dealing with Bribery & Corruption: A Management Primer (1999) (on file
with authors) (explaining the efforts at Shell).
109. See id. at 20.
Vol. 33
2000 Fighting Corruption
bribe payments will pass undetected. Successful firms should be highly
capable of implementing these policies.110 A persistent failure to do so
raises questions as to whether it is actually a "bad barrel" that is producing
the "bad apples."
D. Ethical Justifications for Paying Bribes
One possible explanation for bribery's prevalence is that many people sin-
cerely believe the practice is ethically justified."' Many managers have
made these claims over the years. Based on anecdotal experience, a plausi-
ble case can be made to justify bribery under well-established theories in
business ethics.
For example, can a consequentialist analysis, which considers an
action desirable if it produces overall good consequences, be used to sup-
port some forms of bribery?112 The judgment can be made with regard to
a particular bribe payment, or a system of bribery within a political or
economic system. In the former, one could evaluate the consequences in
reference to the single payment. In the latter, one could estimate the over-
all impact of recurring patterns of bribery within a country. In both
instances, one must estimate the impact on all those directly affected.
Positive consequences accruing to the bribe-payer from coarse bribes
may include increased profits, increased employment, and greater security
for the bribe-payer's creditors. The bribe-receiver gains the value of the
bribe payment itself. In a very corrupt society, the bribe may even over-
come inefficient government regulation and provide a more efficient alloca-
tion of resources.
Offsetting these positive consequences are a host of potential negative
consequences.'1 3 There is an overall inefficient allocation of resources
where decisions are based on personal benefit to the bribe-receiver, not
political rules or markets. Further, the secrecy of bribery may reduce the
value of price information. Philip Nichols takes an extremely hard line,
arguing that bribery may diminish the happiness of the citizenry, reduce
110. Cf. Timothy L. Fort &JamesJ. Noone, Gifts, Bribes, and Exchange: Relationships
in Non-Market Economies & Lessons for Pax E-Commercia, 33 CoMELL INT'L L. J. 515
(2000) (discussing a naturalist role for corporations to serve as mediating institutions
for controlling problematic behaviors and implying that it may be necessary for the cor-
poration to focus on subunits within the organization while at the same time providing
all members of the organization with a clear understanding of the justifications for an
anti-bribery policy).
111. No current survey data supports this opinion. Any survey attempting to identify
such viewpoints would be seriously constrained by respondents seeking to provide
socially desirable answers. Believing that bribery is widely condemned and therefore
assuming that those conducting the survey want to hear a condemnation of bribery,
individuals who personally believe that bribery is ethical may not be likely to say so.
There are techniques that could be used to control for this social desirability effect, but
they would have to be carefully employed.
112. For a brief description of consequentialism, see JAmEs RAcHELS, THE ELEMENTS OF
MoRAL PHILOsOPhy 107-21 (3d ed. 1999).
113. See Dunfee et al., supra note 102, at 23-28.
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the credibility and efficiency of government, and increase lawlessness. 114
For example, bribery often requires some manipulation of a firm's finan-
cial reports. If this is sufficiently widespread, individuals may lose confi-
dence in the reliability of financial statements. This in turn can have a
serious deleterious effect on capital markets. As U.S. Secretary of State
Madeline Albright stated: "Corruption is not capitalism's natural product,
but its perversion."' 15
Examples given in the first section of this article lend credence to these
claims. 116 Where bribery results in officials ignoring environmental and
safety regulations, individuals may be physically harmed as a result of the
ensuing hazards. The extreme result is the well-publicized case of the Chi-
nese "bean curd bridges." In China, the state bank financed projects
designed to improve the infrastructure and boost the economy, but the
projects were so riddled with corruption that bridges, buildings, dikes,
roads, and other works collapsed almost as soon as they were completed,
killing and injuring hundreds of people. 117
The emerging view today is that in most cases the negative conse-
quences of bribery dominate the positive effects, often leading to lower eco-
nomic growth and sub-optimal government spending.118 Thus, a rule
consequentialist, who devises rules based on probable outcomes in lieu of
making calculations for every decision, would devise a rule forbidding cor-
rupt payments. On the other hand, as Ronald Green suggests, there may
be specialized circumstances, particularly where the negative impact of not
paying is large for the bribe payer and the overall impact on others of mak-
ing the payment is not great, where an act consequentialist may justify a
bribe.119
However, as Dunfee, Smith, and Ross suggest, it is difficult to apply act
consequentialist analysis to bribes.' 20 In addition to serious problems
with forecasting the likely effects of bribery, there is a daunting problem of
commensurability. Some costs, such as the loss of trust in a society or the
loss of credibility in financial documents, may be virtually impossible to
114. See Phillip M. Nichols, Outlawing Transnational Bribery Through the World Trade
Organization, 28 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 305, 337-43 (1997).
115. Nora Boustany, Anti-Vice Vice President, WAsH. Posr, Feb. 26, 1999, at A24.
116. See supra Part I.A.
117. See Henry Chu, China May Be Heading Down Road to Ruin, L.A. TIMEs, Mar. 1,
1999, at Al (commenting that in one month, two bridges collapsed in different parts of
China, killing over 40 people and leading to the arrest of project officials); John Pomfret,
Flimsy Bridges of Qijiang County: Corruption and Incompetence Causing China's Infra-
structure to Crumble, WASH. PosT, Apr. 4, 1999, at All (stating that in the metropolis of
"Chongqing alone last year, 1,600 people died because of shoddy work on construction
sites or collapsing infrastructure projects, causing more than $ 7.3 million in damage").
118. See Cheryl W. Gray & Daniel Kaufman, Corruption and Development, 35 FIN. &
DEv. 7, 8 (1998) (arguing that the claimed benefits of bribes do not outweigh the costs);
Paolo Mauro, Why Worry About Corruption?, IMF EcON. IssuEs SeraES 9-12 (1997)
(reviewing empirical evidence); see also Mauro, supra note 19, at 11 (discussing corrup-
tion's influence on government spending).
119. See Ronald M. Green, When Is 'Everyone's Doing It' a Moral Justification?, 1 Bus.
Emics Q. 75 (1991).
120. See Dunfee et al., supra note 102, at 23-24.
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compare to direct monetary benefits such as the projected profit on a par-
ticular contract. Because of these serious problems, it is unlikely that one
can genuinely rely on either type of consequentialist analysis to justify a
policy of regularly making corrupt payments.
Alternatively, deontological analysis may justify a pattern of bribery.
A deontic analysis focuses on whether there has been an intentional viola-
tion of a binding moral duty.121 In the case of a bribe payer, there must be
some binding duty that either condemns or justifies a pattern of bribery.
A possible justifying duty is that one should respect the cultural norms of
other countries. Bribery is often associated with cultural patterns, and its
form varies substantially across cultures. 122 Various cultural names such
as guanxi,12 3 blat,124 and bakshish125 identify the practice in certain coun-
tries or areas of the world. Although claims are often made for cultural
justifications of bribery, it is difficult to build a case for the cultural accept-
ability of coarse public sector corruption. Noonan claims that every coun-
try criminalizes bribery in some form. 126 The fact that coarse corruption
is typically kept secretive implies a lack of true cultural acceptance.
In addition, there are other duties that require bribes not to be paid.
The bribe-receiver will often take the payment in return for violating a legal
duty or the terms of an employment contract. The bribe-receiver is often
an agent who owes a duty to a principal to act in a certain way.127 The
payment, which causes the bribe-receiver to act inconsistently with that
duty, therefore represents an alienation of agency. These more specific
duties often trump any broader duty to respect local culture and result in
an ultimate condemnation of coarse bribery. Thus, it is difficult to sustain
a deontological case for bribery.
A third alternative, an ethical analysis based on social contracts,
obtains the same result. Under this approach, bribery is unethical if it vio-
lates relevant community norms or is inconsistent with manifest universal
ethical principles one would expect rational actors to adopt for all commu-
nities.128 The basis of the social contract approach is to identify the
authentic norms of relevant communities that would apply to a given busi-
ness decision. If these local norms do not violate manifest universal ethical
principles, they constitute a source of moral obligation. Thus, if a host
121. For a brief description of deontology, see RAcHE.s, supra note 112, at 122-42.
122. See Thomas Donaldson & Thomas Dunfee, When Ethics Travel: The Promise and
Peril of Global Business Ethics, 41 CAL. MGMT. REv. 45 (1999); Jeffrey A. Fadiman, A
Traveler's Guide to Gifts and Bribes, 64 HAuv. Bus. REv. 122 (1986).
123. See Anna M. Han, Hong Kong's Economy Under Chinese Rule: Prosperity and Sta-
bility?, 22 S. ILL. U. I.J. 325, 335 (1998).
124. See Sheila M. Puffer & Daniel J. McCarthy, Business Ethics in a Transforming
Economy: Applying the Integrative Social Contracts Theory to Russia, 18 U. PA. J. INT'L
EcoN. L. 1281, 1297-98 (1997).
125. See Dove Izraeli, Business Ethics in the Middle East, 16 J. Bus. ETHICS 1555, 1557
(1997).
126. See NOONAN, supra note 27, at 702.
127. See DONALDSON & DuNFEE, supra note 95, at 224-26.
128. See DONALDSON & DuNwE, supra note 95, at 25-47 (presenting the Integrative
Social Contracts Theory).
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community had norms supporting the payment of bribes, it might serve as
an ethical justification for bribery.
However, applying a social contract analysis ultimately demonstrates
that coarse bribery is unethical. Thomas Donaldson and Thomas Dunfee
argue that it is rare to find an authentic pro-coarse bribery norm within a
local community. 129 Claims that community members accept a system of
bribery fly in the face of the secrecy typically surrounding bribes. Even if
the norm were authentic, it likely would be limited to a relatively small sub-
community of bribe-payers and corrupt public officials. Such a "pro-bribe"
community would almost invariably exist within a much larger community
holding a contrary anti-bribery norm. After all, the members of these
larger communities bear the negative consequences of bribes in the form of
less efficient government and capital markets. 130
When members of two communities with conflicting norms conduct a
transaction, it is necessary to determine which norm should predominate.
Typically, the norms of the broader anti-bribery community should have
priority over the norms of the smaller pro-bribery community. Donaldson
and Dunfee suggest that one rule of thumb for deciding among conflicting
community norms in a transaction is whether one of the communities has
adopted a prioritization rule.' 3 ' The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, so
long as it represents an authentic norm for the United States, is an example
of a prioritization rule. Thus, a firm from a country with extraterritorial
legislation of this type would have an additional ethical obligation, based
upon a consideration of extant social contracts, to eschew paying a bribe.
This duty would occur even though the company might reasonably esti-
mate that its bribe payment would not be discovered or successfully
prosecuted.132
Even if a pro-bribery community norm had priority, it would still have
to be tested against manifest universal principles. Donaldson and Dunfee
argue that coarse public sector bribery, even in rare situations where it
might be supported by local community norms, violates manifest universal
ethical principles whenever it contributes to human endangerment or the
substantial diversion of public resources. 133 Concepts of justice and
human rights require condemnation of practices that make it impossible
for a country to provide the social goods necessary for minimal standards
of living.134 Supporting this conclusion, a World Bank survey indicates
that bribery is one of the greatest obstacles to growth and development in
developing countries.135
129. See id. at 224-26.
130. See supra Part I.A.
131. See DONALDSON & DuNFEa, supra note 95, at 185-86.
132. Community norms for resolving priority should be applied, so long as they do
not have significant adverse effects on other individuals or communities. See id. at 185.
133. See id. at 226-30.
134. See id.
135. See AYmo BRUNETTI ET AL., INSTITUTIONAL OBSTACLES TO DOING BUSINESS: REGION-
BY-REGION RESULTS FROM A WORLDWIDE SURVEY OF THE PRVATE SECTOR (world Bank Policy
Res. Working Paper No. 1759 1997) (providing region-by-region results that indicate
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Thus, none of the standard approaches recognized by today's business
ethicists provide an ethical justification for coarse bribery. Accordingly, it
does not appear reasonable that ethically informed businesspeople may
believe that they are doing the right thing by consistently paying bribes to
corrupt officials.
IV. Seeking a Principled Solution to the Paradox of Bribery
The growing dichotomy between practice and opinion raises difficult
issues for firms that are either trapped in a cycle of paying bribes or find
themselves subjected to extortionist threats for payments. It also raises the
stakes for firms that have devoted insufficient attention to controlling the
behavior of potential rogue employees. The issue goes beyond a question
of ethical behavior; managers may be neglecting their fiduciary duty to
shareholders if they fail to control corrupt payments.
This article focuses on individual firms and the steps they might take
to combat corruption. Individual firm action is a vital component of the
ultimate mix of policies and strategies that are likely to make a significanf
difference in the practice of corrupt payments. 136 Firms will become truly
serious about the problem only when they have internalized anti-corrup-
tion values; only when the idea of resisting corruption is part of the firm's
core values will it be likely to control the phenomenon successfully. If the
pressure to control bribes is seen as compliance with an external source
such as the government, then firms may only be half-hearted in their con-
trol efforts.' 37
A. Sullivan-Type Principles for Multinational Corporations
Firms need a unilateral solution that would alleviate the coordination prob-
lem facing them as a result of potential defections from an anti-bribery
regime. Specifically, a firm's use of the Sullivan-type principles approach,
coupled with the new alternatives for social reporting and auditing, can
significantly contribute to the reduction of global corruption. This Article
focuses on the C2 Principles (for Combating Corruption).
Codes of conduct and sets of principles guide how corporations con-
duct their business at home and abroad. Almost all corporations have
internally developed codes of conduct that govern issues such as discrimi-
nation, worker safety, and illicit payments. These codes vary greatly from
corporation to corporation, both in their specific provisions and means of
implementation. In addition to individually developed corporate codes,
corruption is one of the greatest obstacles to investment in developing countries). The
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development also recently identified corruption
as one of the greatest obstacles to economic growth in former communist bloc coun-
tries. See Stefan Wagstyl, EBRD Singles Out Corruption as a Big Obstacle to Progress, FIN.
TIMEs, Nov. 9, 1999, at 11.
136. The role of firms as "mediating institutions" in dealing with corruption is dis-
cussed at length in Fort & Noone, supra note 110.
137. See Lynn Sharp Paine, Managing for Organizational Integrity, HAuv. Bus. Ray.,
Mar.-Apr. 1994, at 106, 109-11.
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outsiders have proposed sets of principles corporations should adopt to
guide their behavior in morally troubled contexts. 138 Well-known exam-
ples include the Sullivan Principles on doing business in South Africa 139
and the MacBride Principles for conducting operations in Northern Ire-
land.140 Other codes exist with respect to businesses' impact on the envi-
ronment' 4 ' and human rights.142
In addition to guiding corporate behavior, these principles promote a
unified course of action against particular problems. Working from these
models, this Article proposes a uniform set of C2 Principles to guide corpo-
rate behavior and assist in combating corruption and bribery. The C'
Principles act as a voluntary public pledge against bribery, as well as a
basis for external monitoring of corporate behavior. Before describing
these principles in greater detail, this section briefly discusses the history
of the Sullivan Principles.
In 1971, Reverend Leon H. Sullivan, a Baptist Pastor in Philadelphia
and member of the General Motors board of directors, attempted to per-
suade General Motors to divest from South Africa due to the government's
apartheid policies. 143 Because he could not win the other directors' sup-
port, Reverend Sullivan established the Sullivan Principles in 1977 to help
promote racial equality in South Africa through the influence of large cor-
porations. The original set of six principles was a voluntary code designed
to guide the practices of U.S. corporations doing business in South Africa.
These principles covered equality in hiring and pay, non-segregation in the
workplace, training and promotion of blacks, and the improvement of the
quality of life of employees outside the workplace. 144
138. For a critique of the use and development of codes of conduct in the area of
international business ethics, see Steven R. Salbu, True Codes Versus Voluntary Codes of
Ethics in International Markets: Towards the Preservation of Colloquy in Emerging Global
Communities, 15 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 327 (1994).
139. John Christopher Anderson, Respecting Human Rights: Multinational Corpora-
tions Strike Out, 2 U. PA. J. LWi. & EMP. L. 463, 477 (2000).
140. For a discussion of the MacBride Principles, see generally Kevin A. Burke, Fair
Employment in Northern Ireland: The Role of Affirmative Action, 28 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROBs. 1, 10-13 (1994).
141. For a discussion of the Valdez Principles, now known as the CERES Principles,
see generally Elizabeth Glass Geltman & Andrew E. Skroback, Environmental Activism
and the Ethical Investor, 22J. CoR'. L. 465, 470-75 (1997); Valerie Ann Zondorak, A New
Face in Corporate Environmental Responsibility: The Valdez Principles, 18 B.C. ENvm. AFF.
L. REv. 457 (1991).
142. Principles concerning human rights include the Slepak Principles for doing bus-
iness in the former Soviet Union and the Miller Principles concerning business relation-
ships with the People's Republic of China and Tibet. SeeJorge F. Perez-Lopez, Promoting
International Respect for Worker Rights Through Business Codes of Conduct, 17 FORDIHAM
INT' LJ. 1, 12-19 (1993).
143. See id.
144. The original six principles stated:
1. Non-segregation of the races in all eating, comfort and work facilities.
2. Equal and fair employment practices for all employees.
3. Equal pay for all employees doing equal or comparable work for the same
period of time.
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Included with the principles was a system to evaluate a corporation's
compliance. This system required corporations to file reports with Rever-
end Sullivan, submit to audits by a public auditing firm, and provide infor-
mation on the firm's performance to its employees. 145 With this disclosed
information, the consulting firm of Arthur D. Little compiled and pub-
lished reports comparing the performance of the signatory firms. 146 Cor-
porations were ranked as "making good progress," "making progress," or
"needs to become more active."' 47 However, Arthur D. Little did not dis-
close its grading methods, which raised some skepticism about the evalua-
tion process.' 48
In 1987, Reverend Sullivan called the principles a failure149 and aban-
doned them in favor of a call for total divestment in South Africa.150 Even
though the principles did not end apartheid within the timeframe set by
Sullivan, they fostered significant progress and were likely one of the fac-
tors that led to its abolition.' 5 ' Between 1977 and 1982, the number of
firms adopting the principles increased from twelve to almost 150.152
These corporations provided scholarships to blacks, increased the number
of nonwhite supervisors and managers from only a handful to 30%,15 3 and
provided over $150 million in funding for health, education, and housing
in their communities.1 54 In addition, corporate executives stated that the
collection and disclosure of information required by the Sullivan Principles
allowed them to learn from the experiences of others in programs for
4. Initiation and development of training programs that will prepare in substan-
tial numbers Blacks, and other non-whites for supervisory, administrative, cleri-
cal and technical jobs.
5. Increasing the number of Blacks and other non-whites in management and
supervisory positions.
6. Improving the quality of employees' lives outside the work environment in
such areas as housing, transportation, schooling, recreation and health
facilities.
Anderson, supra note 139, at 477.
145. See id. at 478.
146. See Zondorak, supra note 141, at 474; Perez-Lopez, supra note 142, at 43. The
Industry Support Unit, an organization of the signatories to the Sullivan Principles,
employed Arthur D. Little for this task. See id.
147. Perez-Lopez, supra note 142, at 43.
148. See generally Alexandra Bernasek & Richard C. Porter, Private Pressure for Social
Change in South Africa: The Impact of the Sullivan Principles, 55 REv. Soc. EcoN. 172
(1997). Many signatory corporations also provided their performance information to
the Investor Responsibility Research Center, which published the information in its peri-
odic newsletters. See id.
149. See Richard T. De George, "Sullivan-Type" Principles for U.S. Multinationals in
Emerging Economies, 18 U. PA. J. IrLr'l EcON. L. 1193 (1997).
150. See Zondorak, supra note 141, at 478.
151. For a limited empirical analysis challenging the effectiveness of the Sullivan Prin-
ciples, see generally Bernasek & Porter, supra note 148.
152. See Anderson, supra note 139, at 478.
153. See Perez-Lopez, supra note 142, at 43. This progress continued throughout the
1980s. The percentage of white workers managed by nonwhites increased from 3.1% in
1983 to 8.4% in 1984. See Zondorak, supra note 141, at 476.
154. See Perez-Lopez, supra note 142, at 43. During 1988 and 1989, these corpora-
tions donated $60 million to programs for minorities. See id. at 476.
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desegregation, training, and employee housing.155
Many factors encouraged corporations to adopt the Sullivan Princi-
ples. One commentator listed:
increased media reporting; university hype and rising public interest con-
cerning the role of business in South Africa; the need to improve corporate
image and credibility with domestic groups; the growing number of share-
holder resolutions calling for adoption of the Sullivan Principles; and the
growing use of the Sullivan Principles by investors as a measure for moral
determinations regarding their investments.156
When Sullivan called for divestment in South Africa, these same factors
also encouraged that behavior. 157
Today, Reverend Sullivan supports and promotes a general set of prin-
ciples known as the Global Sullivan Principles for individual firms to
endorse.' 58 These broad principles represent a general policy commitment
by an endorsing firm to ideals of equal opportunity and quality of life.
Their coverage far exceeds the more targeted and specific anti-apartheid
principles and encompasses respect for intellectual property and a commit-
ment to sustainable development. The only proviso of the Global Sullivan
Principles dealing with bribery is: "Promote fair competition.., and not
offer, pay or accept bribes."159
B. Developing Anti-Corruption Principles
To have an impact on the practice of corruption, any set of principles must
(1) emphasize transparency; (2) provide guidance concerning specific
practices associated with paying bribes; (3) be relevant to organizational
environments; (4) identify itself with and be supported by an independent
entity such as a non-governmental organization or an academic center,
and, perhaps most- importantly; (5) be capable of monitoring and assess-
ment by external, independent entities, such as social and financial audi-
tors. Although some existing statements of principles that contain
references to bribery meet some requirements, none meet them all. For
example, although the Global Sullivan Principles have great credibility in
their association with Reverend Leon Sullivan, their generality with regard
to bribery provides little guidance to firms concerning specific practices.
In fact, it would be virtually impossible to determine whether a firm is
acting consistent with the standard. A firm with an excellent anti-corrup-
tion program, which meets the standards of current practice, might still be
victimized by a rogue employee and therefore seemingly fail to meet the
Global Sullivan standard. Similarly, Richard De George's proposed stan-
dards, discussed briefly below, offer only general guidance and are not yet
connected with a supporting independent entity.
155. See Zondorak, supra note 141, at 475 n.92.
156. Id. at 477 (citations omitted).
157. See id. at 479 n.120.
158. See The Global Sullivan Principles (visited Aug. 26, 2000) <http://department.st
thomas.edu/mccr/SullivanPrinciples.htm>.
159. See id.
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C. Sources for the C2 Principles (for Combating Corruption)
The proposed C2 Principles draw from the International Chamber of Com-
merce's rules of conduct, the recent consent agreement between the United
States and Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., pertaining to the Foreign Corrupt Prac-
tices Act, compliance and control programs already existing at firms, the
business ethics literature, and other sources.
In the recent civil case United States of America v. Metcalf & Eddy,
Inc.,160 the defendant was accused of providing an Egyptian government
official with travel, lodging, and entertainment expenses to induce that
official to grant Metcalf & Eddy two sanitary drainage contracts sponsored
by the United States Agency of International Development (USAID). 16 1
Without admitting or denying these allegations, Metcalf & Eddy agreed to
a settlement with the Department of Justice (DOJ), which required the com-
pany to establish an FCPA compliance program. In other settlement agree-
ments, the DOJ required companies to implement FCPA compliance
programs, but Metcalf was the first time the DOJ outlined minimum
requirements for such a program.162 The DOJ developed the compliance
program based on the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, which the
DOJ adapted to the specific case of bribery and Metcalf & Eddy's situation.
The compliance program required Metcalf & Eddy to articulate a clear
policy against FCPA violations and establish standards and procedures
"reasonably capable of reducing the prospect of violative conduct."'163 The
company must assign one or more senior officials to oversee the compli-
ance program, including monitoring and auditing systems to detect viola-
tions by employees and other agents, and appropriate disciplinary
mechanisms for violations and monitoring officials who failed to detect a
violation. The program must also require employees, agents, consultants,
and other representatives of the company to be trained regularly regarding
the company's compliance policies and procedures. 16 4
The firm should establish a reporting system that allows an employee
to report suspected criminal conduct without having to go through his or
her direct supervisor and without fear of retribution. 1 65 Metcalf & Eddy
160. The authors obtained copies of the complaint and the consent and undertaking
filed by the defendant from the Fraud Section of the Department ofJustice (on file with
authors) [hereinafter Defendant's Filings].
161. The alleged payments involved two trips the Egyptian official made to the United
States. Under the Federal Travel Regulations, Metcalf & Eddy could provide the official
with a cash per diem payment to cover certain travel expenses in advance of his visit.
On these trips, however, Metcalf & Eddy provided the official with 150% of estimated
expenses, paid for most of the official's expenses once he and his family were in the
United States-the expenses the per diem was intended to cover-upgraded the official's
airline tickets to first class, and had two undocumented cash advances granted to a Met-
calf & Eddy official prior to and during one of the official's visits, which were presumed
to be cash payments to the official.
162. See Susan Kavanagh, Minimum Requirements for FCPA Compliance Program, in
FEDERAL Enmcs REPORT, Jan. 2000, at 1.
163. Defendant's Filings, supra note 160.
164. See id.
165. See id.
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also should establish procedures and a review committee to insure against
the delegation of authority to or partnership with individuals or companies
with a propensity to engage in corrupt behavior. All contracts with agents
and other representatives should include a clause stating that the firm will
offer no bribes and the agent will not employ a sub-agent without the prior
written consent of a senior official of Metcalf & Eddy. Finally, the com-
pany should keep records that accurately reflect all transactions and dispo-
sitions of the company's assets and maintain a system of internal
accounting controls.166
In 1996, the ICC adopted Rules of Conduct to Combat Extortion and
Bribery and encouraged corporations to adopt and adapt these principles
in their own codes of conduct.167 The ICC established the code of conduct
as a method of self-regulation. The code provides that no one may directly
or indirectly accept or demand a bribe or a kickback, including the use of
subcontracts, purchase orders, or consulting agreements to channel pay-
ments to others. When using agents, the enterprise must ensure that it
pays the agents only for services rendered and not for paying bribes. The
enterprise should also maintain a record of those agents and their terms of
employment. Enterprises must properly and fairly record all financial
transactions and establish independent systems of auditing. Top manage-
ment or the board of directors should establish a system of control to pre-
vent the payment of bribes, provide clear policies and training programs,
and take appropriate action against anyone who breaches the code of con-
duct. In addition, enterprises should disclose any contributions to political
parties.
Richard De George proposed the idea of "Sullivan-like" principles for
U.S. multinationals doing business in Russia and other former Soviet
states. 168 He offered five simple principles, including that "[s]ignatories
will not pay bribes or extortion." 169 De George reasoned that if a number
of companies concurrently take such an approach, they would avoid the
onus of individual action, helping to offset the power of the mafia and cor-
rupt government officials.170 He also suggested that endorsing the princi-
ples would send a signal to U.S. consumers that the signatories are
operating ethically in those environments. 171 De George further argued
that the transparency resulting from this approach would make it difficult
for corrupt officials to demand bribes, thereby encouraging the develop-
ment of adequate and efficient background institutions-both legal and
governmental, which are necessary to support a less corrupt
166. See id.
167. See ICC, Extortion and Bribery in International Business: Part II: Rules of Conduct
to Combat Extortion and Bribery (visited Aug. 26, 2000) <http://www.iccwbo.org/home/
statements_rules/rules/1999/briberydoc99.asp>.
168. See De George, supra note 149.
169. Id. at 1203.
170. See id. at 1200-03, 1206-07.
171. See id. at 1206-07.
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environment. 17 2
D. The C2 Principles' 73 (to Combat Corruption)
The following principles are offered to all firms, wherever situated and
whatever their lines of business. 174 In addition, the principles are applica-
ble to all business activities of the endorsing firms. A corporation endors-
ing the C2 Principles pledges:
1. To disclose publicly and make widely known its endorsement of
the C2 Principles.
2. To establish a dearly articulated written policy prohibiting any of
the firm's employees from paying or receiving bribes or "kickbacks."
3. To implement the policy with due care and take appropriate disci-
plinary action against any employee discovered to have made payments in
violation of the policy.
4. To provide training for employees to carry out the policy, and to
provide continuing support, such as help lines, to assist employees to act in
compliance with the firm's policy.
5. To record all transactions fully and fairly, in accordance with
clearly stated record-keeping procedures and accounting controls, and con-
duct internal audits to assure no improper payments are made.
6. To report annually on the firm's bribery and corruption policy,
along with a description of the firm's experiences implementing and
enforcing the policy.
7. To have the annual report in principle six audited either by an
independent financial auditor or an independent social auditor, or both.
8. To require all agents of the firm to affirm that they have neither
made nor will make any improper payments in any business venture or
contract to which the firm is a party.
9. To require all suppliers of the firm to affirm that they have neither
made nor will make any improper payments in any business venture or
contract to which the firm is a party.
10. To establish a monitoring and auditing system to detect any
improper payments made by the firm's employees and agents.
172. In 1995, the Clinton Administration published a set of Model Business Princi-
ples for corporations operating abroad. See Beverley Earle, The United States' Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act and the OECD Anti-Bribery Recommendation: When Moral Suasion
Won't Work, Try the Money Argument, 14 DIcK. J. INT'L L. 207, 227-28 (1996). This set
consisted of five principles, including one that simply states that corporations should
comply with U.S. laws prohibiting illicit payments. These principles gained little atten-
tion because they were vague and not well-publicized by the White House. See id. at 227-
228 (noting that the principles were unveiled by mid-level officials who did not want
their names used, at a location away from the White House, and on paper without any
U.S. government identification).
173. As endorsed and approved by the Caux Roundtable. See supra note 82 and
accompanying text.
174. This is in contrast to proposals such as those made by De George, which are
applicable only to firms from designated home countries and certain regions of the
world. See De George, supra note 149.
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11. To report publicly any solicitations for payments, or report pri-
vately to a monitoring organization or a social auditor.
12. To establish a system to allow any employee or agent of the firm to
report any improper payment without fear of retribution for their
disclosures.
1. Policies, Procedures, and Publications
Throughout the C2 Principles run the overlapping themes of policies, pro-
cedures, and publications. Policies refer to a firm's avowed commitment to
refuse to pay bribes and to train its employees to carry out firm policies to
that effect. Firms should not endorse the principles simply for public rela-
tions purposes or to emulate other firms in their industry. Rather, firms
should only endorse these principles on a voluntary, sincere, and genuine
basis. Adhering to these principles requires a firm to move beyond merely
establishing a code of conduct to proactively guiding the behavior of corpo-
rate employees and establishing a compliance program to prevent improper
payments.
Principles one through four reflect the required policies. By adopting
the principles, a corporation signals its full commitment to combating cor-
ruption to its external stakeholders and employees. This is an external
affirmation that fighting corruption is a core value of the firm. Establish-
ing this as a core value also requires making all employees aware of the
firm's policies and providing appropriate training and support to guide
employees in making decisions consistent with those policies. To establish
the legitimacy of these policies requires taking disciplinary action against
employees who violate them.
The second theme is necessary procedures. Principles five, eight,
nine, ten, and twelve establish procedures to control payments inconsistent
with corporate policy. These procedures work to control bribery from a
variety of angles. First, under principle five, firms need appropriate
accounting and auditing practices to ensure that they have authorized and
accounted for all firm expenditures. Principles eight through ten focus on
controlling common problems firms have in complying with the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act. Agents, particularly those assisting with sales and
marketing, often have been the conduits through which firms have made
payments. In some circumstances, firms may not have known whether the
marketing agents have used part of their commissions and fees to make
improper payments to public officials.
Due to these problems, the DOJ's compliance program for Metcalf &
Eddy, for instance, requires a committee to review the firm's retention of
any agents and to exercise due care to ensure against employing an agent
with a propensity to make improper payments. The DOJ's program also
requires all agents to sign contracts stating that they will not make
improper payments or retain subagents without the prior written consent
of a Metcalf & Eddy senior officer. The C2 Principles are consistent with
this compliance program in that they require firms to obtain from their
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suppliers and agents statements to the effect that they have not and will not
make improper payments.
Principle ten goes even further, requiring that firms use an auditing
system to detect any improper payments. In addition, principle twelve fur-
thers the ability of employees to report any violations without fear of retri-
bution. The establishment of anonymous hotlines can achieve this
objective, so that whistleblowers do not have to file reports through anyone
in their immediate management.
The third theme, publication, concerns full disclosure of the firm's
efforts and performance. Principles one, six, seven, and eleven further this
goal. As discussed above, principle one signals commitment to combating
bribery to those outside the firm. Principles six and seven provide for
external validation of a firm's efforts. Perhaps the most controversial pro-
viso is principle eleven, which requires that firms commit to public report-
ing of solicitations for payments or, if that is not feasible because of threats
of violence or extortion, they report the request privately to a social auditor
or a monitoring organization, such as Transparency International. Public
disclosure is probably the best way to discourage the demand side of
bribery.
2. Coherence and Credibility
To reduce the supply side of bribery, the C2 Principles require coherence
and credibility. 175 Coherence refers to a unified approach for combating
bribery, such as through the adoption of the same set of principles by
,many corporations. Credibility requires assurances that each corporation
is living up to its pledge through independent monitoring and public
disclosure.
A coherent approach provides several significant benefits. It levels the
playing field by ensuring that all corporations are playing by the same rules
and that government officials are fully aware of those rules. By knowing
that its competitors are not paying bribes, a corporation is assured that it
does not have to pay a bribe and can compete based on the quality and
price of its product or service. The efforts of non-bribe-paying corpora-
tions facilitate other corporations' efforts to find honest agents, suppliers,
and other business partners, as they are not required to "reinvent the pro-
verbial wheel" on each business venture in a new country or region. 176
Overall, a coherent approach strengthens a firm's ability to operate bribe-
free, as "[j]oint refusal of payment of bribes or extortion lessens the neces-
sary courage, cost, and difficulty of refusal to do so individually."1 77
175. See RobertJ. Liubicic, Corporate Codes of Conduct and Product Labeling Schemes:
The Limits and Possibilities of Promoting International Labor Rights Through Private Initia-
tives, 30 Lav & PoI'Y IN'L Bus. 111, 113, 131-39 (1998) (arguing for coherence and
credibility in corporate codes of conduct and product labeling schemes to promote inter-
national labor rights).
176. See De George, supra note 149, at 1201 (discussing the problems of attempting
to communicate a message of corrupt-free business dealings firm by firm in Russia).
177. Id. at 1206.
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On the demand side, corrupt government officials would know that
corporations would deny and possibly disclose their requests for bribes.
As seen from the experience with Transparency International's Corruption
Perception Index, being known as a highly corrupt country can be highly
embarrassing for a country's top government officials, may have financial
implications from lowered foreign direct investment, and can spur reforms
in that country. 178 This is also supported by the Council of Europe's
efforts to reduce corruption by using "peer pressure" to encourage govern-
ments to implement necessary reforms. 17 9
A coherent approach also provides benefits to the public. Investors,
consumers, and other stakeholders of the firm can easily determine if a
firm is doing its part to combat corruption and bribery. Without this
coherence, an interested stakeholder would have to analyze each firm's
code of conduct to determine its approach, if any, to combating bribery.
While a coherent approach requires a significant number of firms
independently to adopt the C2 Principles to be fully effective-since only
then can the problems of defections and free-riding be overcome-there are
significant benefits to each adopting firm. Beyond the cooperative benefits,
a firm's endorsement signals to the market that it is taking seriously the
moral concerns regarding corruption. Further, any firm attempting to ride
on the efforts of others can easily be singled out.
A business principles approach to combating bribery must also be
credible. Credibility requires external monitoring and public disclosure.
The firm should disclose its policies, performance, and auditors' reports,
as well as its pledge to the principles. These could be freestanding reports
disclosing the firm's performance, or they could be incorporated into other
reports of the corporation. This requirement of the C2 Principles is consis-
tent with current developments in corporate disclosure on social issues.
The idea of corporate social auditing, accounting, and reporting (SAAR) is
gaining popularity in Europe and the United States. SAAR is similar to
financial accounting and reporting, but focuses on measuring the social
performance of a corporation in relation to the expectations of the firm's
stakeholders. 180
The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) is a major international effort to
improve the quantity and quality of social reports available to the pub-
lic. 18 1 Formed in 1997, the GRI is a collaborative effort of large accounting
firms, non-governmental organizations, corporations, universities, and
others. It seeks to establish a common framework for corporate reporting
that allows corporations and their stakeholders to understand better the
link between a firm's economic, environmental, and social performance. A
178. See supra Part I.B.
179. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
180. See Hess, supra note 97, at 43. Social reports concern firm performance on such
issues as the environment, product safety, employment discrimination, and community
involvement. See id. at 69-70.
181. See generally Global Reporting Initiative, Sustainability Reporting Guidelines:
Exposure Draft for Public Comment and Pilot Testing (visited Sept. 14, 2000) <http://
www.globalreporting.org>.
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firm's compliance with the C2 Principles easily could be incorporated into
reports published under the GRI or some other standard. In addition, a
firm's efforts at monitoring compliance could benefit from the SAAR
processes a firm must establish to produce a social report.
Whether published as part of a broader social report or as a stand-
alone report, a firm should annually provide publications to the widest
possible audience regarding its performance with respect to the C2 Princi-
ples. For example, making such reports available on a company website
would be a cost-effective way for the corporation to provide this informa-
tion to any interested person. Based on these public disclosures, an entity,
such as Transparency International, may compile information on corpo-
rate performance.
By making this information public, monitoring mechanisms would
emerge in the same way as with the Sullivan Principles. The Sullivan Prin-
ciples used a system of foundation monitoring. 182 A foundation funded by
the signatories of the principles used a third-party agent to monitor the
firms' compliance with the principles. Many were dissatisfied with this
approach, however, as the monitoring agent did not reveal its system for
rating corporations' compliance with the Sullivan Principles. 18 3 This non-
disclosure raised significant doubts about the credibility of the system. To
avoid these problems, the C2 Principles require an independent monitoring
agent or agents operating under conditions of full transparency. This
approach is necessary to ensure that corporations have a compliance pro-
gram and meet all twelve principles.
An effective monitoring system requires trustworthy information.
Beyond issues of disclosure, the increased focus on SAAR also serves to
develop the auditing and verification aspects of a social reporting process.
When the Sullivan Principles were first announced, corporations and
accounting firms had little experience auditing these non-traditional
aspects of accounting. While C2 principle five concerns more traditional,
accepted accounting procedures, the overall goals of the principles are in
line with the developments in SAAR. Organizations such as the Institute of
Social and Ethical AccountAbility 184 in the United Kingdom, which is
developing auditing standards and an accreditation path for accountants
and auditors in SAAR,' 85 can provide significant assistance in establishing
the credibility of reports filed under the C2 Principles.
V. Conclusion
Throughout the world, an attitude is emerging that corruption is a serious
problem that can no longer be tolerated. Corporations that are not respon-
sive to these attitudes may suffer a backlash in capital and consumer mar-
182. See Liubicic, supra note 175, at 135.
183. See generally Bernasek & Porter, supra note 148.
184. See AccountAbility Inst. of Soc. & Ethical Accountability, AccountAbility (last
modified July 31, 2000) <http://www.accountability.org.uk>.
185. See AccountAbility Inst. of Soc. & Ethical Accountability, The AccountAbility Pro-
fessional Qualification (visited Feb. 12, 2001) <http://www.accountability.org.uk.F.htm>.
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kets. By adopting the C2 Principles proposed here, a firm can demonstrate
its commitment to fighting corruption. With many corporations adopting
the Principles, a cooperative, anti-bribery system emerges; a system that
may significantly reduce the supply of corruption.
